The Changing Face of Ukraine

After the formal inception of its independence on August 24th 1991, Ukraine has arguably changed the entire foundations of its society, economy and government from its former Soviet republic identity. Having been an exploited industrial centre and impoverished member of the Soviet Union, the country’s early years sought to diminish the communist influence over its parliament and prove its status as one of the world’s democracies. The greater part of the last decade has featured Ukraine’s heightened desire to be granted membership status into intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as NATO and the European Union (EU), and its continued denial is a deep-rooted, but extremely pertinent issue, in understanding the international relations of the modern world.

Some back-story: Ukraine, geopolitically an eastern neighbour of the EU and situated in the Post Soviet Space (PSS), constantly functions under the shadow of the great power Russia, which has made clear that its influence in Eastern Europe is far from over. The problem, then, is that Ukraine has not yet successfully made it clear to the international community that it stands independently of the decisions of Russia, and its capacity to exercise any sort of autonomous function is ironically hindered by the international community’s lack of support for the acceptance of Ukrainian independence.

As an example of this, such IGOs as the European Union do not yet find Ukraine’s annexation an investment worthy enough to anger Moscow over, even while seeing the real domestic developments toward EU standardization and a status of global cooperation that post-2004 Ukraine has already implemented and prospered from, such as stronger privatization in the market. Similarly, NATO has remained hesitant to accept the Ukrainian applicant. Firstly, it would mean, effectively inciting Russian dissent against the organization. Though at the end of the Cold War NATO changed its mandate from erasing Soviet threat to simply protecting Member States, Russia does not forget it was originally formed for the sole purpose of being as anti-Soviet regime, and it may make claims that NATO is instigating an indirect attempt to impede on its sovereignty by aligning with another post-Soviet nation. In addition, the possibility of NATO having to mitigate the dilemma of uninvited Russian military occupation in South Eastern Ukraine must not seem appealing. It has the obligation to oppose any aggression directed towards any one of its members, and the potential for conflict between NATO and Russia over Ukraine would only escalate with Ukrainian membership, since Russia still sees its occupation in south-east Ukraine as legitimate because of the Black Fleets ethnic allegiances. On the flip side, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is one IGO that seems to see some value in Ukrainian membership yet, as it recently acceded Ukraine under the auspicious that conformity of trade regimes in Eastern Europe will ultimately maximize the benefit of the global economy[1] by stabilizing a currently haphazard region. Still, while Ukraine’s desire for sovereign interactions are aided by this newly recognized place in the world community, the prospects of its complete integration any time soon are austere. At core, this power-struggle between Russia’s grip on full Ukrainian independence and Ukraine’s efforts to break free has been described as a zero-sum game[2].

Where is Ukraine to turn, then, if its quashed efforts have thus far yielded naught but insincere responses by the international community to fully regard Ukraine as capable of becoming at par with middle-powers? After green lights amalgamated into mixed signals from the European Union, Ukraine again set its eye on pursuing and achieving EU membership, but the watch of the EU has become ever more scrutinising in light of the global economic crisis. EU Member States are not quick to jump on the chance for another Easter ally as they recall the events of 2004 in which the premature integration of Romania and Bulgaria successfully detracted from economic progress in the EU through because of a lack of unrelated judicial standardization. Sanctions aside, the EU needs to bear in mind that its enlargement has always proven an effective tool for promoting long-term economic reform and securing liberal democracy in new-member states through the Copenhagen criteria established in 1993. In such cases as the Eastern Bloc enlargements of 2004, where two countries scarred the international image of EU expansion by overshadowing that the creation of economic support frameworks built through multilateral policy-making proved successful in the Baltic region, the EU struggled to remain optimistic about its own potential for expansion, and effectively deterred itself from considering the possibility soon. It is unfair for the international community to give up on Ukraine because of the failiures of its neighbours; Ukraine has proven since its Orange Revolution that it is capable of the type of standards the EU demands for members.

The parliamentary coalitions formed during the Orange Revolution, their breakups and the reformation of new coalitions in Ukraine are not signs of the nation’s weakness. They are the manifestations of a stronger process of legitimizing political activity and democracy in Ukraine. The emphasis on ‘openness, decentralization and the inclusion of civil society in government’[3] the EU provides as the goals of its incentives to help recognize the strong possibility of Ukrainian accession have already been duly noted by Ukraine, and this is entirely indicative of a shift in its political paradigm. What is here important is that Ukraine is proving itself as desiring to be more globally-cooperative and to consolidate their strengthening transitional democracy. Ukraine is capable of deciding for itself its role in the international community, and IGOs such as the European Union and NATO should work to help make that so.

[1]The World Bank Ukraine Trade Policy Study

[2]Samokhval, 2007, with the European Union Institute for Security Studies

[3]Yevhen, 2005, ICPS newsletter vol.21